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ecord grain prices have brought a new round of 
prosperity to many corners of rural America. Rising 
crop prices generally bring profit opportunities to 
grain elevators. However, the sharp surge in grain prices in 
2008, coupled with rising farm input costs, has strained the 
financial capacity of many grain elevators.
Grain warehouses are called elevators because upon 
collection, grain is elevated into storage bins before being 
loaded for shipping. Grain elevators are vital to the grain 
marketing system. Through their storage and merchandising 
functions, grain elevators enhance the efficiency in price 
discovery and transportation of grain. Moreover, they 
provide risk-management options for farmers.
This article describes the challenges grain elevators face 
in today’s volatile agricultural environment. The financial 
challenges for grain elevators have risen sharply over the 
past six months and have even led to a few grain elevator 
bankruptcies. In the past, bankruptcies also led to economic 
losses for business partners, particularly farmers who used 
grain elevator services and local banks that extended credit 
to them. 
 Gr a i n El E v a t o r s  101
Grain elevators play a crucial role in agricultural 
commodity markets through the marketing, storage, and 
transportation of grain. Moreover, grain elevators serve as 
local grain merchandisers, linking local farmers to national 
commodity markets, thereby helping farmers manage 
commodity price risk. Many grain elevators also sell farm 
inputs to local producers. 
Grain elevators are a large business activity in rural 
communities, especially in the Midwest and other grain-
producing regions. According to the 2002 Economic 
Census, grain elevators operated in almost 6,000 locations 
and employed over 61,000 workers.1 Grain elevators 
generated almost $90 billion in sales and revenue. Illinois 
had the largest number of merchant wholesaling firms 
(660), followed by Iowa (579), Kansas (493), Nebraska 
(348), and Minnesota (297). 
Since their emergence in the mid-1800s, grain elevators 
have earned income by collecting, storing, and readying 
grain for transportation. Smaller, country grain elevators 
collect grain from farmers, hold it in storage, and coordinate 
transportation to final end users or larger terminal elevators, 
which coordinate larger shipments to other domestic or 
international users. The grain held in storage is either owned 
by the elevator or by the farmers, who pay storage fees.2 
 Grain merchandising—the buying and selling of 
grain—is the traditional business activity of grain elevators. 
An elevator earns income from the spread, or difference, 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 								2008	•	Vol	III			Issue	IIIbetween the price it pays locally to farmers for the grain and 
the price it sells the grain to the next step in the marketing 
channel. Because grain merchandising is a spread business, 
and the spread between the purchase price and sale price 
can be a few cents per bushel, elevators need to move large 
volumes to profit from grain merchandising.
Elevators typically purchase grain from farmers with 
cash or on a forward-cash contract basis. In a forward 
contract, an elevator agrees to purchase a quantity of grain 
from a farmer at a specified quality or grade to be delivered 
on a future date at an agreed-on price. Forward contracts 
are typically consummated pre-harvest, allowing farmers to 
guarantee a crop price and eliminate the risk of falling crop 
prices as harvest approaches. 
Forward contracts, however, expose the grain elevator 
to the risk of falling prices. To offset or hedge this price risk, 
the elevator in turn sells a contract on the futures market. 
If futures prices fall, grain elevators earn a profit because 
they previously sold a futures contract at a higher price. 
Conversely, if futures prices rise, grain elevators lose money 
because they previously sold a futures contract at a lower 
price. Profits and losses in the futures market can offset 
profits and losses in the local cash market (see box).
Finally, many grain elevators, primarily local farm 
cooperatives, also earn income by selling farm inputs to 
local producers. Many cooperative grain elevators, owned by 
farmers, purchase farm inputs in bulk at lower prices to sell 
to their farmer-members. 
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Grain elevators have large financing needs as they 
are subject to collateral requirements when participating 
in futures contracts. These needs fluctuate seasonally, 
depending on the stage of crop production.
Unlike forward contracts with farmers, futures 
contracts are subject to collateral requirements, or margins.3 
The margin is the collateral required of grain elevators 
to cover the risk exposure of the party purchasing the 
futures contract from the elevator. In grain marketing, 
this counterparty risk is the risk that grain elevators may 
not deliver grain in the physical markets, as specified by 
the futures contract, or they may not cover their losses on 
an exchange-traded futures or options position. Margin 
requirements vary by agricultural commodity.4 
Margin accounts are used to settle losses and gains 
associated with changes in the futures prices. At the end 
of each trading day, the exchange’s clearing corporation 
settles futures contracts through the margin accounts. For 
example, if futures prices rise to $6.50 per bushel, grain 
elevators that sold a futures contract, i.e., hold a short 
position, at $6.00 per bushel will experience a loss of $0.50 
per bushel. This loss is removed from the elevators’ margin 
account and transferred to market participants who bought 
the contract, i.e., hold a long position. The opposite occurs 
if prices fall. If the amount of money in the margin account 
falls below minimum requirements due to losses, grain 
elevators receive a maintenance margin call requiring them 
page 2
Bo x  1
Gr a i n El E v a t o r  ri s k Ma n a G E M E n t  w i t h  a Fo r w a r d  co n t r a c t
Net Profits with Rising Crop Prices
Per bushel costs Grain Futures Basis
May:  Purchased grain with a forward contract for December delivery and sell a December futures contract $5.50 $6.00 $0.50
Dec: Sells grain on cash market and buys a December futures contract $6.25 $6.50 $0.25
Profit/loss $0.75 profit $0.50 loss
Net profit $0.25
Net Profits with Declining Crop Prices
Per bushel costs Grain Futures Basis
May:  Purchased grain with a forward contract for December delivery and sell a December futures contract $5.50 $6.00 $0.50
Dec: Sells grain on cash market and buys a December futures contract $5.25 $5.50 $0.25
Profit/loss $0.25 loss $0.50 profit
Net profit $0.25
Note: The basis is the difference between the futures price and the cash price for grain.seasonal increase in the inventories of farm inputs strained 
the cash position of cooperative grain elevators. In addition, 
cash needs surged with record crop prices and margin 
requirements in the futures market.
The first signs of financially strapped grain elevators 
began to emerge in January. Traditionally, as planting season 
approaches, farm cooperatives, which often operate elevator 
facilities, purchase farm inputs to resell to farmers. In 
anticipation of higher farm input prices, many farm input 
dealers had prepurchased crop inputs in the fall of 2007 for 
spring planting. The higher-cost inventories reduced cash 
balances, financially constraining these elevators. In January, 
bankers started to note that grain elevators, which also sold 
crop inputs, began to require prepayment for farm inputs, 
primarily fertilizers and chemicals.
In mid-February, the surge in agricultural commodity 
prices further strained the cash positions of grain elevators. 
With record crop prices, grain elevators faced increasingly 
large margin calls on their futures positions. Banking 
contacts in our district began to report that grain elevators, 
large and small, were requesting increases in existing 
lines of credit, which often had to be met by increasing 
bank participations. Bank participations involve two or 
more banks participating in extensions of credit to reduce 
their risk. For example, one respondent to our district’s 
agricultural credit survey noted that the line of credit for a 
single elevator had risen from $7 million to $57 million and 
required participation by three banks. 
In the wheat market, margin calls rose sharply for grain 
elevators holding short positions. This spring, the wheat 
market experienced the biggest surge in futures market 
prices among the major commodity crops. 
As a result, reports of financially struggling 
grain elevators were more prevalent in 
wheat-growing regions of our district 
(Map 1).
 Bankers in the Kansas City District 
indicate that most grain elevators had 
enough cash to cover margin calls. In 
response to a series of special questions in 
the first quarter agricultural credit survey, 
one-third of the respondent banks with 
to replenish their margin accounts. The higher the increase 
in the price of the futures contract, the higher the margin 
calls. Failure to meet margin calls results in the immediate 
liquidation of the margin account and the futures position 
by the exchange. Once the elevator enters into an offsetting 
contract or delivers grain to fulfill the futures contract, the 
margin requirements and the financial demands on grain 
elevators cease.
The ownership structure of a grain elevator appears to 
influence the source of grain elevator financing. Cooperative 
grain elevators tend to tap the Farm Credit System (FCS) 
for additional lines of credit as these funds tend to be 
cheaper with patronage.
5 Privately owned grain elevators 
more often raise private equity capital, tap parent companies 
for a cash infusion, or turn to commercial banks for 
extended lines of credit. Respondents to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City’s agricultural credit survey, which 
surveys over 300 bankers in the Kansas City District each 
quarter, indicated that the FCS has more direct exposure 
to grain elevator financing than do commercial banks. In 
March, roughly 60 percent of the respondents reported that 
local elevators were receiving funding from the FCS (Chart 
1). A third of the respondents noted that commercial banks 
were funding local elevators.
Fi n a n c i a l  st r a i n s  ri s E in 2008
In a period of rising farm input costs and surging 
crop prices, the financial needs of grain elevators rise. The 
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Farm Credit Banks were working to meet the financial needs 
of grain elevators.6 For example, in the first quarter of 2008, 
the FCS raised $10 billion in funds through the sale of debt 
securities to meet increasing demand from elevators and 
other processing and marketing entities.7 Federal Reserve 
agricultural credit surveys continue to report that loan funds 
available from commercial banks expanded over the past 
year, and the number of loans refused due to shortages of 
funds continued to fall after spiking in 2006. In fact, in the 
first quarter the loan fund availability index for the Kansas 
City District reached its highest level in four years. 
Although banks continue to lend to grain elevators, 
commodity market disruptions have hindered the activity of 
some elevators and their customers. To preserve existing cash 
balances, some grain elevators have limited their offerings of 
futures contracts, basis contracts, and other forward-pricing 
contracts to farmers. An April Web poll by an agricultural 
advisory service indicated that roughly half of their 
respondents could still access normal forward-
pricing options from their regular buyer. 
One-third of the respondents indicated that 
their regular buyer has suspended all new crop 
pricing alternatives. The remaining respondents 
reported that they could still do hedge-to-arrive 
contracts but no longer had access to forward 
or basis contracts.8 
Fu t u r E  ri s k s  F o r  aG r i c u l t u r a l  
co M M o d i t y  Ma r k E t s
Volatility in the agricultural commodity 
markets and the prospects of further price gains 
pose a challenge for the financial situation of 
grain elevators. With the reduced availability 
of forward-contracting arrangements, farmers 
will need to manage price risk differently as the link between 
cash and futures markets has changed. 
The primary risk to the financial position of grain 
elevators is additional spikes in agricultural commodity 
prices. Heading into summer, agricultural commodity 
markets, especially for corn and soybeans, are entering 
a period when prices fluctuate with changing weather 
conditions. For example, spring rains have delayed crop 
planting, which can reduce crop yields. In contrast, a 
summer dry spell could boost prices as corn prices usually 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
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knowledge of the financial conditions of grain elevators 
reported that grain elevators had enough cash to cover 
current margin calls (Chart 2). Another one-third reported 
that local grain elevators had ample cash to cover current 
and future margin calls. Roughly a quarter of the banks 
reported that local grain elevators were struggling to meet 
margin calls.
At an April Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) forum, bank regulators from the FCS and Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City indicated that commercial and 
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experience a two-week rally at the start of August, when 
temperatures in the Corn Belt intensify and rains ease.
Crop prices could also rise with sharp growth 
in demand. Strong ethanol and export demand have 
contributed to record crop prices in 2008. In the latter 
half of 2007 and early 2008, export demand jumped 
sharply, straining existing crop supplies and fueling sharp 
price gains. Prices could rise further with additional 
expansions in U.S. ethanol production or stronger-than- 
expected export demand. Moreover, rising crude oil and 
gasoline prices can strengthen corn prices through ethanol 
production. Higher crude oil and gasoline prices boost 
ethanol prices and profits, which in turn strengthen corn 
demand and crop prices. 
Many industry observers also attribute at least part of 
the recent surge in commodity futures prices to investment 
funds that make large speculative purchases. Unlike the 
buying and selling activity of traditional speculators, who 
provide additional market liquidity, investment funds 
generally buy and hold futures contracts based on portfolio 
allocation formulas, rather than demand and supply 
fundamentals of the underlying commodities.9 The result 
can be a shift in the historical relationship between local 
commodity prices and futures market prices and a new 
challenge to hedging activity by grain elevators and others.10 
Given the potential for rising crop prices and larger 
margin calls, grain elevators could face additional financial 
constraints this summer. However, unlike the financial 
constraints this spring, which were concentrated in the 
wheat-growing areas of the Great Plains, a summer rally 
would probably be concentrated in corn and soybean 
markets. The financial demands could be greater as the corn 
and soybean futures markets are much larger than the wheat 
market. For example, in May, the total number of open 
interest positions in the wheat markets at the Chicago and 
Kansas City boards of trade was more than 600,000, while 
the number of positions in the Chicago corn and soybean 
markets was more than 2 million and roughly 650,000, 
respectively. As a result, more grain elevators covering a 
broader geographic area could face greater financial stress. 
A worst-case scenario is that more grain elevators file 
for bankruptcy. The spring rise in crop prices pushed one 
grain elevator in southeastern Nebraska into bankruptcy.11 
Grain elevator bankruptcies pose risks to the farmers 
who do business with them and the lenders that finance 
them. In the past, grain elevator bankruptcies have led to 
significant losses for local farmers who had stored grain at 
the elevator without a warehouse receipt. Moreover, the 
bankruptcy process can bring delays in the sale, distribution, 
and payment on existing grain held in storage and grain 
scheduled for delivery under forward contracts. Lenders 
also face substantial losses arising from their lines of credit. 
Finally, farmers also lose their local market delivery point 
and then face higher transportation costs by having to 
deliver grain to a more distant location.
In 2008, record crop prices and rising input costs have 
strained the short-term financial position of grain elevators. 
To date, creditors at both commercial and Farm Credit 
Banks appear to be working effectively with the elevators to 
ensure that financing needs are met. Banks are likely to pay 
careful attention to the strength of the risk-management 
practices at grain elevators when deciding to increase cash 
advances. While the sharp rise in agricultural commodity 
prices has eased heading into the summer, unexpected dry 
conditions or strong demand could further boost crop prices 
and rekindle the financial stress at grain elevators.En d n o t E s
 1  Country and terminal elevators are classified in the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) as Grain and Field Bean Merchant 
Wholesalers (NAICS 424510) and Farm Product Warehousing and Storage 
(NAICS 493120).
2  Upon deposit of grain in an elevator, the farmer receives a scale/weight 
ticket after the grain is weighed, but this is not a document of title.  If the 
grain is delivered to an elevator for storage and ownership is retained by 
the farmer, the farmer should receive a warehouse receipt as a certificate of 
ownership. A depositor can deposit grain under so-called open storage, but 
the delivery of the grain is not backed by a warehouse receipt. Warehouse 
receipts are crucial in identifying grain ownership in the event of the 
liquidation of a grain elevator. See Roger A. McEowen and Neil E. Harl, 
“Rights of Farmers in Failed Grain Elevators,” Agricultural Law Digest, Vol. 
11 No. 21, October 27, 2000.
3  Futures and options contracts are traded on organized exchanges, like 
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the Kansas City Board of 
Trade (KCBOT). Exchanges have clearing corporations that minimize 
counterparty risk to the exchange and to all parties that trade on it by 
requiring an initial margin deposit, which acts like a performance bond.
4  For example, on the CBOT the initial margin requirement is $1,000 per 
corn contract and $3,500 per soybean contract.
5  The FCS, a so-called government sponsored enterprise (GSE), is the largest 
agricultural lender in the United States. It is a nationwide network of 
lending institutions that are owned by their borrowers. 
6  The CFTC is an independent agency with the mandate to regulate 
commodity futures and option markets in the United States. On April 
22, 2008, the CFTC hosted an Agricultural Forum to discuss agricultural 
commodity market issues. Public comments and presentations were 
obtained on May 22, 2008, at www.cftc.gov.
7  As a GSE, the FCS is able to issue debt in the agency debt market.
8  Forward cash contracts for deferred delivery allow the grain producer to set 
or lock in the price of the commodity. A hedge-to-arrive contract allows 
the producer to lock in the future price, but allows the basis or difference 
between the futures price and the local cash price to vary. In contrast, a 
basis contract allows a producer to lock in the basis, but does not lock 
in the final price. The USDA’s Risk Management Agency has more 
information about these types of contracts. http://www.rma.usda.gov/
pubs/1997/irm_c.html. 
9  See “Testimony of Michael W. Masters before the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Government Affairs”, United States Senate, May 
20, 2008 and Statement of the National Grain and Feed Association to the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, April 22, 2008.
10 The role of investment funds in commodity futures markets is open to 
additional study. For example, in recent congressional testimony, CFTC 
economists, who monitor futures markets, indicated that speculative 
activity played little if any role in surging commodity prices in agricultural 
futures markets. See “Written Testimony of Jeffrey Harris, Chief 
Economist before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs,” United States Senate, May 20, 2008, obtained May 
22, 2008 at www.cftc.gov.
 11 Todd Neeley, “Grain Elevator Closures” DTN, obtained on May 14, 
2008, at www.agobservatory.org/.
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